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R&D-based models of endogenous technical progress rest on a premise
that technical progress is driven by proﬁt-seeking entrepreneurs. This lit-
erature led to a dominant view that endogenous technical advance is not
consistent with perfect competition with constant returns to scale. De-
parting from this dominant perspective, we demonstrate that technical
progress endogenously occurs in a perfectly competitive economy under
constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs. Our result is based on a
hypothesis that R&D creates codiﬁed and tacit knowledge as joint prod-
ucts. Empirical and case studies are discussed to support the hypothesis.
Using the model, we demonstrate that stronger patent protection can
encourage or discourage R&D, depending on the size of an economy.
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1 Introduction
Neo-classical growth models with perfect competition are silent on determi-
nants of technical progress. Motivated by this observation, R&D-based mod-
els of endogenous technical progress were proposed as an alternative analyti-
cal framework for long-run economic growth. Those R&D-based models rest
on a central premise that technical progress is driven by proﬁt-seeking en-
trepreneurs, and innovative activity is compensated by proﬁts generated in
an imperfect product market. Importantly, this inﬂuential Schumpeterian ap-
proach implies that endogenous technical advance does not occur in a perfectly
competitive economy with constant returns to scale. This conclusion is widely
accepted among policy makers, and behind policy discussion of intellectual
property rights.1
This paper departs from this dominant Schumpeterian perspective, and ar-
gues that proﬁt incentives and monopoly power are suﬃcient but not necessary
for endogenous technical progress. We demonstrate that technical progress en-
dogenously occurs in a perfectly competitive economy under constant returns
to scale in rivalrous inputs. This result comes in stark contrast with the land-
mark implication of R&D-based models of endogenous growth. Our argument
is based on the distinction between codiﬁed and tacit knowledge, and a hy-
pothesis that both types of knowledge are joint products of R&D activity.2
Codiﬁed knowledge is detailed speciﬁcations of new technology, which is
codiﬁed in a written form (e.g. manuals and journals). An example is a
source code of a computer software. On the other hand, tacit knowledge is
not (or even cannot be) stated in an explicit form.3 But, it allows experts
to obtain desired results without reﬂecting on codiﬁed knowledge. That is,
tacit knowledge is ideas of how to eﬃciently implement codiﬁed knowledge
and even create new codiﬁed knowledge. An example is a software engineer’s
1For examples, see a series of books titled “Innovation Policy and the Economy”, pub-
lished by MIT Press.
2See Polanyi (1966) who explicitly introduces the concept of tacit knowledge. Although
introducing tacit knowledge into the context of innovation is not new (e.g. Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995), our novel contribution is that tacit knowledge is explicitly incorporated
into a Schumpeterian growth model to establish that endogenous technical progress occurs
under perfect competition.
3A good example is how to ride a bicycle. People usually become able to ride a bicycle
after practices rather than reading instructions. It is because of diﬃculty conveying an idea
of how to ride a bicycle to other people in words.
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programing ability developed through accumulated experiences.4 In the joint
product hypothesis, innovative activity creates codiﬁed and tacit knowledge,
the latter of which is embodied in innovators. The next section discusses some
examples which illustrate this hypothesis.
A deﬁning characteristic of codiﬁed knowledge is non-rivalry. It “can be
used as often as desired, in as many productive activities as desired,” as Romer
(1990) stresses. Due to this public-good nature, he argues that monopoly prof-
its are required to compensate R&D inputs. This is the aspect of innovative
activity that existing R&D-based models emphasize most. In a sense, tacit
knowledge also plays an implicit role in those models. For example, consider
the model of Romer (1990). R&D workers become more able to do research
activity as new codiﬁed knowledge is created.5 This assumption is equivalent
to saying that researchers accumulate tacit knowledge which is useful in ap-
plying existing codiﬁed knowledge to create new codiﬁed knowledge. This is
a plausible assumption, given that any R&D activity is a learning process.
However, an assumption is made that tacit knowledge is a pure public good.
It is non-rivalrous in the sense that tacit knowledge instantaneously diﬀuses
across all workers at no cost without degrading its quality.6 It is also non-
excludable, since it is not possible for R&D workers to prevent from others
beneﬁting from their learning experiences. Because of this public-good nature,
no innovator can appropriate returns from the creation of new tacit knowledge,
and monopoly proﬁts are the only source to motivate researchers.
However, we argue that tacit knowledge has a degree of excludability, be-
cause one’s ability to utilize codiﬁed knowledge and even create new codiﬁed
knowledge is not automatically transmitted to other people. Such ability can
be gained only through costly learning. This observation is supported by, e.g.
a case study of the biotechnology industry in Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998)
and an empirical work of Cohen and Levinthal (1989). To the extent that tacit
4The relevance of distinguishing two types of knowledge is illustrated by questionnaire
results reported by Jensen and Thursby (2001) regarding licensing university inventions to
private ﬁrms. University technology transfer oﬃcers think that 71 percent of the inventions
licensed require cooperation by the inventor for successful commercialization. Another rele-
vant study is Darby and Zucker (2003), who argue that new high-tech industries are created
around universities where inventing scientists work, because their active participation is es-
sential for commercialization. They base their view on the study of Mowery and Ziedonis
(2001) who present evidence consistent with it.
5The stock of knowledge At increases according to ˙ At = δtRt, δ > 0 where Rt is the
number of researchers. δt is R&D productivity that increases as new knowledge is created.
6If tacit knowledge has a degree of rivalry in the Romer model, an identity or work history
of researchers should matter. But it is not the case in his model.
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knowledge is excludable at least partially, innovators can appropriate returns
from creating codiﬁed knowledge by jointly producing tacit knowledge.
Based on this insight, we propose an R&D-based growth model where re-
searchers are motivated by an increase in returns in general over and above
returns earned before innovation. Such increased returns consist of monopoly
proﬁts, if codiﬁed knowledge is excludable, and returns from the creation of
tacit knowledge in the form of intellectual human capital.7 In a competitive
economy with zero monopoly rent, competitive returns from tacit knowledge
embodied in innovators can be suﬃcient to compensate R&D activity, and
endogenous technical progress occurs. Note that this result is compatible with
constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs where aggregate income is ex-
hausted as factor payments. This conclusion comes in stark contrast with the
landmark implication of R&D-based models of endogenous growth that en-
dogenous technical progress is not consistent with perfectly competitive econ-
omy.8
At this stage it is important to discuss some diﬀerences between human
capital used in existing growth models and intellectual human capital that
accumulates due to tacit knowledge in our model. In general, human capi-
tal refers to the ability or skills to perform economic activity, and it is often
assumed to accumulate through schooling, on-the-job training and learning-by-
doing. Typically, those activities are broadly deﬁned to include, e.g., primary
education and productivity improvement of unskilled manual workers, which
is irrelevant to the joint product hypothesis in our study. On the other hand,
the accumulation of intellectual human capital requires technically more ad-
vanced learning activities, e.g. tertiary education and engaging in research.
This is because tacit knowledge we consider concerns abilities to use and cre-
ate new technologies. In addition, we believe that the following two aspects
are important in our model where tacit knowledge creates incentives for R&D.
First, since the creation of codiﬁed knowledge is highly uncertain, so is the
generation of tacit knowledge. This is an ex ante uncertainty facing innova-
tors. Second, when codiﬁed knowledge becomes obsolete, innovators may face
obsolescence of the associated tacit knowledge. This is an ex post risk facing
innovators. On the other hand, we also allows for a degree of transferability
of tacit knowledge across codiﬁed knowledge to capture reality.9
7The phrase is used in Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998).
8See below for a few studies which demonstrate a similar result.
9See Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), for example.
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The joint product hypothesis is related to but distinct from the concept
of complementarity between technology and human capital in an important
way. Technology-skill complementarity means that a given technology requires
speciﬁc human capital to implement it. This insight has been widely used in
the literature, e.g. to explain increasing wage inequality. In general, exist-
ing studies concern consequences of technology-skill complementarity. On the
other hand, the joint product hypothesis is more relevant to the issue of how
such complementarity may arise in the ﬁrst place. In this sense, our study is
closer to Acemoglu (1998). Moreover, a similar, but distinct hypothesis is used
by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Jovanovic (1998) to represent knowledge-
human capital complementarity.10 They assume that schooling or/and on-
the-job training boost human capital, and new knowledge is created as their
byproducts. Given the absence of an explicit form of R&D, those studies are
not suitable for the analysis of how R&D activity is compensated in a com-
petitive economy. Our paper is also related to studies on multi-stage R&D.
For example, Aghion and Howitt (1996) and Li (2000) develop models where
a new variety of products must be created before their quality is improved.
In Cozzi and Galli (2008), quality innovation requires two successes in R&D,
capturing the notion that a novel scientiﬁc discovery necessitates further in-
novative activities for industrial applicability. In those models, two diﬀerent
types of research together generate codiﬁed knowledge, whereas one type of
research produces two types of knowledge in our model.
The most important result of the present paper is that endogenous techni-
cal progress can be sustained in a competitive economy with constant returns
to scale in rivalrous inputs, when codiﬁed and tacit knowledge are jointly pro-
duced in R&D. We also examine the issue of whether the competitive economy
generates greater or smaller R&D incentives than a monopolistic economy.
Analysis shows that results depend on the size of an economy. When it is
large, the competitive economy grows faster than the monopolistic economy.
The result is reversed when the size of the economy is small. This result
has important implications regarding the role of intellectual property rights in
promoting R&D.
10There are three more approaches to model complementarity in the literature; (i) human
capital accumulation is endogenous, but technology is exogenous (e.g. Caselli, 1999; Chari
and Hopenhayn, 1991) and (ii) the reverse of the approach (i) (e.g. Lloyd-Ellis, 1999), (iii)
technology and human capital are created endogenously in separate generation processes
(e.g. Acemoglu, 1998).
4Competitive Innovation T. Haruyama
There are some studies which oﬀer diﬀerent approaches to endogenize tech-
nical progress in a competitive economy. One strand of studies stress that
codiﬁed knowledge is only imperfectly non-rival, arguing that the assumption
of complete non-rivalry is an approximation of reality (Boldrin and Levine,
2008; Quah, 2002a,b).11 By contrast, our model argues that tacit knowledge
is imperfectly non-rival, maintaining an assumption that codiﬁed knowledge
is perfectly non-rivalrous in line with existing R&D-based models. The sec-
ond class of studies highlight the role of inframarginal rents that arise due
to diminishing returns to scale (Shell, 1973; Hellwig and Irmen, 2001).12 In
our model, an assumption of constant returns to scale is maintained, so infra-
marginal rents play no role. On the other hand, in the model of Zeira (2006),
industrialization raises workers’ wages, which in turn induce ﬁrms to invent
more capital-intensive machines, replacing workers. Through this process, an
economy grows even without monopoly proﬁts.
2 The Joint Product Hypothesis
2.1 Example 1
The current form of the biotechnology industry has been built on the remark-
able discovery in 1973 of the basic technique for recombinant DNA by two
academic scientists, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer. The technique essen-
tially allowed scientists to create an artiﬁcial DNA by taking a gene from an
organism and inserting it to another. Codiﬁed knowledge of this technique is
found in published journals. On the other hand, an important feature of the
technology when it was invented is its complexity and tacitness required to im-
plement it. That is, tacit knowledge of the technique was needed to implement
codiﬁed knowledge in practice. This made the knowledge diﬀused only slowly,
as other scientists learned through, e.g., coauthoring and Ph.D. supervision.
Such slow diﬀusion of the technique reﬂects a slow diﬀusion process of tacit
knowledge. It is tacit knowledge, since ideas of how to use the new codiﬁed
11W¨ alde (2005) shows that innovation is sustained in a competitive market by assuming
that innovators possess and sell the very ﬁrst unit of new products, earning returns from
R&D. This assumption makes knowledge imperfectly non-rival.
12On the other hand, Boldrin and Levine (2002a) considers a slightly diﬀerent, but closely
related issue of technology adoption in a competitive economy. See also Jovanovic and
MacDonald (1994) who model technical innovation and imitation in a competitive industry
in a partial equilibrium model.
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knowledge is embodied in those who invented and learned the technique. For
this reason, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) use “intellectual human capital”
to refer to those who accumulate tacit knowledge. As more people learned the
new technology, its tacitness fell. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) consider
1990 as the year when a gene sequence discovery became routinized. However,
it does not mean that tacit knowledge became less useful. It simply means
that the tacit knowledge was then embodied in a larger number of scientists
than before.13 In this sense, invention created new codiﬁed knowledge and, at
the same time, tacit knowledge which was embodied in the inventors.14
2.2 Example 2
A diﬀusion process of tacit knowledge is also illustrated by the famous case
of a hybrid corn. It was an invention of creating superior corn, which tripled
corn grain yields in the U.S. between 1930s and 1980s.15 But, “[i]t was not a
single invention immediately adaptable everywhere” (Griliches, 1957, p. 502).
Adaptable hybrids had to be created for diﬀerent regions. Successful adap-
tation required an improved understanding of the technique and localities,
resulting from eﬀorts and experiments of farmers and entrepreneurs. That is,
tacit knowledge of the technique was required for a successful adoption of the
technique. This costly adoption process allowed seed developers not only to
use the technology, but also to accumulate new tacit knowledge in the form of
a deeper understanding of the technique.
2.3 Example 3
The above two examples concern a radical “invention of a method of inventing”
(Griliches, 1957). The third example is the development of open source soft-
wares. Developers at numerous institutions worldwide share the source code
for some computer software programmes and contribute to their reﬁnement
by ﬁxing bugs and modifying the code (e.g. Apache and Linux).16 A license,
attached to open source softwares, ensures their free distribution. Given their
13Indeed, the fact that they still possess human capital did not change, even if knowledge
diﬀusion had taken place instantaneously.
14See also Darby and Zucker (2003) for a similar example about nanotechnology.
15See Bauman and Crane (1992).
16Source code is what programmers write using one of programming language (e.g. C and
Java), which can be modiﬁed by other programmers. Commercial softwares are created by
converting a source code into machine language (a string of 0s and 1s), which is very diﬃcult
for humans to read or write.
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non-rivalry and non-excludability, the open source software development came
initially as a surprise to economists. What motivates developers to contribute?
Two related answers are oﬀered by Lerner and Tirole (2002).
First, participants in the development of open source softwares may be able
to improve productivity of jobs set by the employer. One can also extend this
argument to participants’ overall productivity of programming jobs, which
are not speciﬁc to the employer. By creating new codiﬁed knowledge (i.e.
improving softwares), developers accumulate tacit knowledge, pointing to the
case of the joint product hypothesis. The second reason suggested by Lerner
and Tirole is career concerns. “[T]he compensation process is dynamic so that
reputation-building – successfully submitting code that meets the rigorous
standards of excellence demanded by the Open Source community – increases
the individual’s likelihood of accession to high-paying software employment”
(Quah, 2002c, p. 29). According to this “signaling” view,17 innovative activity
increases returns from tacit knowledge.18 Therefore, in the sense of market
valuation, codiﬁed and tacit knowledge may be taken as joint products of
R&D. Note that the two reasons oﬀered by Lerner and Tirole suggest that
an expected increase in returns, but not necessarily proﬁts, induces people to
engage in creative activities.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
The above discussion suggests that codiﬁed and tacit knowledge are created as
joint products of creative activity. This joint product hypothesis is also consis-
tent with a famous empirical study of Cohen and Levinthal (1989). They show
that R&D has two faces; one is to create new knowledge and the second is to
improve the ﬁrm’s productivity to learn and absorb existing knowledge. The
second face of R&D means that the quality of engineers and scientists, i.e. in-
tellectual human capital, can be enhanced through R&D. Importantly, Cohen
and Levinthal empirically conﬁrm that ﬁrms recognize the second aspect of
R&D in their decisions. They show the possibility that knowledge spillovers en-
courage R&D investment because of the absorptive nature of R&D, in contrast
17This point is also relevant to science. Dasgupta and David (1987) hypothesize that
ﬁnancial remuneration for scientists is not trivial. Scientists build up reputation of their
ability in their early career stages, and their research activity is ﬁnancially compensated
later. Indeed, this hypothesis is conﬁrmed empirically by Stephan and Everhart (1998).
18Quoting an oﬃcial who runs an IBM Linux development team, Financial Times (2003)
writes that “Of the 1,000-odd developers actively working on Linux, more than half are now
direct employees of big tech companies.”
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with a conventional view that the externality tends to create underinvestment
in R&D. Their study shows that ﬁrms invest in R&D for dual purposes in
anticipation of returns both from new knowledge and an enhanced absorptive
capacity, which can be interpreted as the accumulation of tacit knowledge.19
2.5 Excludability of Tacit Knowledge
In the above examples tacit knowledge, once obtained, can be used for pro-
ductive purposes. Viewed this way, returns from technology creation (and
adoption) are interpreted to consist of two parts; the ﬁrst part comes from the
use of codiﬁed knowledge, and the second part from the accumulation of tacit
knowledge. This indicates the possibility that new technology is created (and
adopted) if returns from the accumulation of tacit knowledge alone is suﬃcient
to compensate the cost of technology creation or/and adoption.
Codiﬁed knowledge is non-rivalrous, whereas tacit knowledge is rivalrous,
since the person who possesses tacit knowledge cannot be physically present at
two or more places simultaneously (see Romer, 1990). On the other hand, other
people will eventually possess tacit knowledge via learning without degrading
the quality of knowledge embodied in innovators and early adopters. In this
sense, tacit knowledge also has an aspect of non-rivalry. Because of its non-
rivalrous aspect, tacit knowledge diﬀuses to other people.
On the other hand, tacit knowledge is characterized by natural exclud-
ability (see Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). It is not particularly costly
to prevent others from using the same knowledge at least initially because of
high learning costs. This property makes a diﬀusion process of tacit knowledge
(e.g. recombinant DNA) slow. For this reason, the original inventors and early
adopters of the technique earn “excess” returns (see Stephan and Everhart,
1998).20 Once diﬀusion completes, returns fall back to the “normal” level, as
19In a more recent empirical study, Griﬃth, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) conﬁrm
the importance of two “faces” of R&D in explaining productivity convergence among devel-
oped economies. On the theoretical front, absorptive capacity is modelled in Schumpeterian
growth models of Keller (1996), Lloyd-Ellis (1999) and Griﬃth, Redding, and Van Reenen
(2004).
20In biotechnology, the typical employment pattern of university-based scientists was that
they aﬃliate with private ﬁrms, often retaining a faculty position. Stephan and Everhart
(1998) ﬁnd that 67.1% of scientists in their sample holds an equity position in the ﬁrm, and
about 10% of the scientists hold suﬃcient options or stock which requires disclosure at an
initial public oﬀering. This kind of active involvement of academic scientists in the start-up
and running of private ﬁrms “extends well beyond biotechnology,” according to (Jensen and
Thursby, 2001, p. 242).
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the supply of those with tacit knowledge increases. But as long as it is use-
ful for productive purposes, tacit knowledge holders earn returns, which they
could not have gained without innovative activity. The main argument of the
current paper is that such competitive returns may be suﬃcient to motivate
researchers to engage in R&D.21
3 Returns to Scale and Related Studies
Using the concept of returns to scale, this section relates our model to some
of existing studies which demonstrate the possibility of endogenous technical
progress in a competitive economy.
Consider the production function of output Y = F (A,N,K) where A
is the stock of codiﬁed knowledge which is non-rivalrous. K and N denote
the number of workers with and without tacit knowledge. Assume that the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs N
and K. In a competitive economy, income is exhausted as factor payments
and there is no compensation for innovative activity, i.e.
Y = wNN + wKK (1)
where wN = ∂F
∂N and wK = ∂F
∂K. For this reason, Romer (1990) argues that
imperfect competition is necessary for endogenous technical progress, so that
proﬁts compensate R&D activity.
In our model, on the other hand, imperfect competition and proﬁts are
not necessary for endogenous technical progress. This can be explained by
rearranging (1) as
Y = wN (N + K) +
 
wK − wN 
K. (2)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is payments to all rivalrous factors, N
and K, before R&D generates tacit knowledge for K workers. This is the
amount of payments, which must be made irrespective of whether or not tech-
nical progress occurs. After all, without technical progress all people in this
economy would be identical without intellectual human capital. The second
21The reward system of science described contrasts with a traditional view that proﬁt
motives play a minor role. This view is based on the assumption that scientiﬁc knowledge
is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This public good assumption may be less relevant to
some scientiﬁc disciplines than before.
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term represents total monetary rewards for those who created tacit knowledge
through R&D. Given that codiﬁed and tacit knowledge are joint products of
R&D, that term also represents compensation for R&D. In this sense, perfect
competition is compatible with R&D activity.
Using equation (1), we next explain how our approach diﬀers from existing
studies. Here we consider two theoretical approaches to endogenize technical
progress in a competitive economy. The ﬁrst approach is to drop the as-
sumption of constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs, which results in the
existence of quasi rents. In his partial equilibrium model, Shell (1973) suggests
that such quasi rents can compensate innovative activity. Given that the logic
of the usual replication argument, quasi rents are equivalent to payments to a
ﬁxed factor under constant returns to scale. Interpreting K as a ﬁxed factor
in (1), wKK represents such quasi rents. A downside of this argument is the
lack of a clear link between the ﬁxed factor and innovative activity, as pointed
out by Romer (1990). In a modern incarnation of Shell’s insight, Hellwig and
Irmen (2001) develop a general-equilibrium model that attempts to correct
this shortcoming.
The second approach is based on the observation that knowledge is only
ﬁnitely expansible in practice. Finite expansibility essentially means that the
quantity of a good can be reproduced at a ﬁnite rate (Quah, 2002a,b,c). Dif-
ferently put, it means that knowledge diﬀuses at a ﬁnite rate. Under this
assumption, the knowledge stock A is approximately rival. Given this, the
production function F (A,N,K) can be assumed to exhibit constant returns
to scale in A, N and K. Under a special case of Y = βA, ∞ > β > 1, Boldrin
and Levine (2002b) show that the price of one piece of knowledge is positive.
That is, innovative activity is compensated in a competitive economy. Quah
(2002a) conﬁrms Boldrin and Levine’s result, but he shows that their result
does not hold when time is continuous and knowledge is inﬁnitely expansible.
4 Competitive Innovation
4.1 Consumers
To develop our argument in a familiar framework, we extend the quality-ladder
model of Aghion and Howitt (1992). There are L number of workers who
supply one unit of labour service at each point in time. They are identical
ex ante, but heterogeneous in equilibrium due to the accumulation of tacit
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knowledge. Those who accumulate tacit knowledge are called “knowledge
holders.” We denote the number of knowledge holders by K, and others by
N. All consumers are risk-neutral, hence the interest rate r is constant.
4.2 Production of Goods and Knowledge
Time is continuous. The production function of ﬁnal output Yt is
Yt = Atxα
t , 0 < α < 1, t = 0,1,2,.... (3)
xt is the amount of intermediate goods, whose quality is given by At. A
subscript t denotes the number of innovations, such that At+1 = λAt where
λ > 1 measures the size of quality innovation. In this class of models, ﬁnal
output producers use the top-quality intermediate goods only (see below on
this point).
Intermediate goods xt are produced using the constant returns to scale
technology in knowledge holders and non-holders. Using wK
t and wN
t to denote







as a unit cost of x. An assumption implicit in (4) is that knowledge holders can
be used across diﬀerent quality levels due to transferability of tacit knowledge
across diﬀerent technologies. This point will be discussed in more detail in the
next section.
The intermediate good industry is perfectly competitive. That is, a newly
created blueprint of the state-of-the-art good is freely available. In this sense,
codiﬁed knowledge is a pure public good. This assumption removes the pos-
sibility of monopoly proﬁts being used to compensate R&D activity. Note
that the price of an intermediate good equals the unit cost (4). It should be
obvious, therefore, that ﬁnal output producers always use the highest quality
intermediate good available.
























t , m = K,N.
The quality index of intermediate goods At rises by a factor λ > 1 whenever
an innovation occurs through research activity. There is free entry in the R&D
sector, i.e. any worker without tacit knowledge can engage in research if she
wants. However, non-knowledge holders alone cannot produce new technology,
and they have to work together with knowledge holders. One can imagine
that tacit knowledge is passed on from knowledge holders like PhD students
learning from their supervisors. Suppose that N
g
t number of workers without
tacit knowledge engage in R&D. A typical worker j work with k
g
t number of
knowledge holders to generate innovation with a Poisson arrival rate of



















t is the total number of knowledge holders employed in
R&D in the economy as a whole. For simplicity, we assume that additional
tacit knowledge is not obtained for those who already have one.
The economy-wide Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the intermediate
goods industry is gt ≡ N
g
t gjt. We assume that the R&D technology (7) has
the following property:





(7) and (8) mean that the economy-wide R&D technology exhibits constant
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4.3 Joint Products of R&D
The production of intermediate goods requires Nx
t and Kx














All workers are identical ex ante, and the ex post heterogeneity of workers
arises due to R&D activity. In the R&D sector, one of N
g
t workers (who work
with knowledge holders) at most succeeds in R&D at each point in time. If
successful, new knowledge in both codiﬁed and tacit forms is created. Codiﬁed
knowledge comes as a blueprint of a higher quality good, and tacit knowledge
as intellectual human capital. Those who fail in R&D cannot gain tacit knowl-
edge.22 These assumptions capture the joint product hypothesis in a simple
way.
An important feature of technical progress is creative destruction in which
new goods drive existing goods out of the market. Under the joint product
hypothesis, it is plausible to assume that new knowledge, codiﬁed and tacit,
renders obsolete not only existing codiﬁed knowledge, but also its associated
tacit knowledge. On the other hand, we allow for the possibility that tacit
knowledge is transferable across codiﬁed knowledge to some extent. For ex-
ample, experiences and expertise associated with the invention of the state-of-
the-art computer processor are likely to be useful for designing and producing
the next-generation products, which render the former obsolete.23 Put diﬀer-
ent, the creative destruction eﬀect is likely to be smaller for tacit knowledge
than for codiﬁed knowledge. This observation can be captured by assuming
that each knowledge holder faces a risk of her tacit knowledge being obsolete
with the probability of 1 ≥ µ > 0 whenever innovation occurs. µ measures the
degree of obsolescence of tacit knowledge or intellectual human capital due to
technical progress.
Therefore, the number of those with tacit knowledge changes whenever








22This assumption could be replaced with a more general assumption that only a fraction
of unsuccessful workers gain tacit knowledge. But, this generality generates no additional
insight.
23This observation is consistent with Nelson and Phelps (1966) who argue that, compared
with unskilled workers, skilled workers have greater capacity to implement new technologies.
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The left-hand side is the number of knowledge holders after innovation occurs.
On the right-hand side is the sum of a worker who newly gains tacit knowledge
and the number of knowledge holders whose tacit knowledge does not become
obsolete.
Income mobility envisaged in equation (13) is summarized in Figure 1.
Workers without tacit knowledge, if successful in R&D, join the pool of knowl-
edge holders, boosting their income to wK
t from wN
t . On the other hand, a
fraction µ of knowledge holders are driven down to the lower income class due
to obsolescence of their tacit knowledge. This dynamic description suggests
that social mobility is positively correlated with entrepreneurial activity, hence
economic growth. This prediction seems consistent with data.24
4.4 R&D Incentives
Consider an R&D worker without tacit knowledge who earns a competitive
wage wN
t . If her innovative activity turns out to be fruitful, a blueprint is
created for a higher quality intermediate good (codiﬁed knowledge), and at
the same time, she will gain tacit knowledge. Given no proﬁt being made,
returns from R&D consist of an incremental competitive wage wK
t −wN
t until
her tacit knowledge becomes obsolete. Then, the expected present value of
future ﬂows of net incremental wages, Vt, is deﬁned by
rtVt+1 = wK
t+1 − wN
t+1 + gt+1 [(1 − µ)(Vt+2 − Vt+1) − µVt+1]. (14)
This equation is interpreted as follows. A worker who succeeds in R&D gains
incremental wages wK
t+1 − wN
t+1 until the next innovation arrives. When an
additional innovation occurs, she loses the value Vt+1 if her tacit knowledge
becomes obsolete with the probability of µ or gains Vt+2 − Vt+1 with the
probability of (1 − µ). Such gain and loss occurs with the Poisson arrival rate
of gt+1. Note that the innovator continues gaining returns from tacit knowledge
with the probability of (1 − µ). This represents the fact that an innovator
partially “internalizes” what is known as the intertemporal knowledge spillover
eﬀect. Codiﬁed knowledge created by an innovator will be used by future
researchers who do not pay for it. This positive externality is to some extent
24See Quadrini (2000) on the link between entrepreneurship and social mobility, and Au-
dretsch and Thurik (2001) and Reynolds, Camp, Bygrave, and Autio (2001) for a positive
relationship between entrepreneurship and growth. Also see Galor and Tsiddon (1997) for a
growth model where social mobility occurs.
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mitigated due to transferrable tacit knowledge. That is, an innovator can
capture future surplus by keeping tacit knowledge useful with a chance of
(1 − µ).25
There is free entry in R&D. Therefore, entry continues until excess returns
from conducting R&D, which is given by







becomes zero. That is,26








t > 0. This condition also ensures that R&D workers without tacit
knowledge are indiﬀerent between working in the R&D and manufacturing
sectors.
Free entry or (16) implies that part of Vt+1f (k
g
t,1) or “gross beneﬁts” of
R&D is used to pay wages to knowledge holders. In this sense, ﬂows of in-
cremental wages wK
t − wN
t are “shared” between a non-knowledge holder and
knowledge holders. However, wage payments are made only if R&D turns out
successful. That is, knowledge holders do not get paid if R&D is unsuccess-
ful. The reason why knowledge holders work in the R&D sector is that they
receive a higher payment than wK
t if R&D succeeds. Indeed, the expected











which is the ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing (15). Given that they are risk-
neutral, knowledge holders engage in R&D as long as the expected payment is
equivalent to wage that they can obtain for sure in the manufacturing sector.
25In the model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), a similar feature arises in the case of incum-
bent ﬁrms conducting R&D. Also note that complete internalization requires µ = 0, which
cannot occur in our model.
26Π












t , using (8). This in turn implies (16),
given (8) and (9).
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4.5 Equilibrium Analysis
4.5.1 R&D Incentive Condition
In steady state, labor allocation between R&D and manufacturing must be
time-invariant, i.e., Km
t and Nm
t , j = x,g must be constant. In such equilib-
rium, aggregate output Yt grows at a rate of (λ − 1)g on average,27 and wages
wK
t and wN





= λ, m = K,N, (18)
using the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization of intermediate goods
producers.28
Using this result along with (14) and (16), we derive the following compet-
itive R&D incentive condition:
(w − 1)λ
cg (w)
= r + mg (RIC)
where
m ≡ µ − (1 − µ)(λ − 1). (19)
This condition deﬁnes equilibrium R&D intensity g, taking relative factor
prices as given. Alternatively, the condition shows an increase in factor pay-
ments, w − 1, required for tacit knowledge to incentivize workers to do R&D.
The competitive R&D incentive condition (RIC) shows that relative wages
w and R&D intensity g are positively related for m > 0 and negatively for
m < 0. It is because of two opposing eﬀects on the value of tacit knowledge
Vt. First, tacit knowledge of a worker becomes obsolete with the probabil-
ity of µ, reducing V to nil. Through this channel, a higher µ reduces the
value of tacit knowledge, which in turn requires higher relative wages to gen-
erate enough incentives for R&D. This eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term of
(19). Second, tacit knowledge is not rendered obsolete with the probability of
(1 − µ), generating capital gain (λ − 1). Therefore, a higher µ tends to raise
the value of tacit knowledge. Because of this channel, lower relative wages are
enough to generate incentives for R&D. This eﬀect is captured by the second
term of (19). In what follows, we assume that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the
27See Aghion and Howitt (1992) for details.










, using (3) and (4).
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second eﬀect, i.e., m > 0. This is because m > 0 means that higher competi-
tive returns (i.e. higher relative wages) encourage R&D, and this case is most
relevant to the analysis of the joint product hypothesis.29
4.5.2 Labor Market Condition
To determine equilibrium values of g and w, we close the model with the full
employment condition of workers. In the long-run equilibrium, labor allocation
across diﬀerent sectors is constant. This means
1
µ
= Kx + Kg (20)
from (13). This is eﬀectively the resource constraint of knowledge holders. It
says that their number is determined by a parameter µ which captures the
degree of obsolescence of tacit knowledge. But, the allocation of knowledge
holders between R&D and manufacturing is determined along with the R&D








≡ x(g,w), xg < 0, xw > 0 (21)
where the numerator is assumed to be positive. The signs of the derivatives are
easy to understand, interpreting (20) as the resource constraint of knowledge
holders. A higher g mans the expansion of employment of those workers in
R&D, which is possible only if employment in manufacturing falls, i.e. a
reduction of x. On the other hand, higher relative wages reduces demand
for knowledge holders in R&D, but increases it in the manufacturing sector.
Since this expands the production of intermediate goods, x and w are positively
related.















29In the case of m < 0, higher competitive returns from R&D discourage R&D.















The labor market condition (LM) determines equilibrium relative wages, tak-
ing R&D intensity g as given. Its left-hand side is equivalent to the supply
of workers without tacit knowledge, and its right-hand side shows demand for
those workers in R&D and manufacturing. (LM) shows that its right-hand
side is increasing in w. On the other hand, rearrangement gives (22), which
increases or decreases in g, depending on Ψ(w) or relative factor intensity in
workers with and without tacit knowledge. Ψ(w) is positive or negative if
R&D is more or less intensive in knowledge holders than workers without tacit
knowledge, respectively.
4.5.3 Long-run Equilibrium
To make exposition as clear as possible, we introduce two simpliﬁcations. First,
we assume the absence of factor intensity reversal, i.e. Ψ(w) does not change
its sign. This allows us to remove one source of multiple equilibria. Instead, we
consider two cases of Ψ(w) > 0 and Ψ(w) < 0, separately. Second, we focus
upon a “normal” case which is consistent with a widely-accepted presumption
that more patient nations (or economies with a low interest rate policy) grow
faster. In fact, the majority of growth models predict that growth is higher
with a lower subjective rate of time preference.30 This prediction is intuitively
clear, since more patient consumers use more resources to increase future con-
sumption rather than the current consumption. Indeed, it seems diﬃcult to
make a case for impatient consumers devoting more resources to accelerate
growth at the expense of the current consumption.
Given these simpliﬁcations, two relevant cases are depicted in Figure 2
and 3.31 First, let us consider the case of Ψ(w) > 0, which is depicted in
Figure 2. A positive slope of the labor market condition can be understood
as follows. A higher R&D intensity g requires more workers in R&D. Since
innovative activity is more intensive in knowledge holders than manufacturing,
intensiﬁed R&D activity leads to higher relative wages.
30On the other hand, there are some models which predict that growth accelerates as
consumers become less patient (e.g. Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998).
31A higher rate of time preference increases R&D intensity in the remaining unique-
equilibrium case where the R&D incentive condition is steeper than the labor market condi-
tion in Figure 2. This case is not considered for the reason stated above.
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min are relative wages deﬁned by the R&D incentive condition
(RIC) and the labor market condition (LM) when g = 0. An interior equilib-




Another necessary condition comes from (21). Since x must be positive,













This equation deﬁnes the demarcation curve between permissible and imper-
missible combinations of g and w for equilibrium in Figure 2. Substituting





























max are relative wages deﬁned by the R&D incentive condition
(RIC) and the labor market condition (LM) along the demarcation curve
(26). Given that the demarcation curve (26) is downward-sloping in (g,w)




The condition (28) is required for xt > 0 in equilibrium. Conditions (25) and
(28) make sure that the two curves in Figure 2 intersect at least at one point







Next, let us turn to the case of Ψ(w) < 0, illustrated in Figure 3. A
negative slope of the labor market condition is due to the assumption that
R&D is now less intensive in knowledge holders than manufacturing. Note
that (25) is again a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium. Therefore,
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the following proposition is clear from the discussion so far.
Proposition 1. Under conditions (25) and (28) for Ψ(w) > 0 and (25) for
Ψ(w) < 0, there exists equilibrium where technological progress occurs en-
dogenously in an competitive economy when codiﬁed and tacit knowledge are
produced as joint products of R&D.
4.5.4 Comment on Relative Wages
The R&D incentive condition (RIC) contains a hypothesis that relative factor
prices are an important determinant of R&D. Some comments are in order on
this point. First, studies on induced innovation (e.g. Kennedy, 1964) demon-
strate that relative factor prices determine the direction of technical progress.
On the other hand, the condition (RIC) deﬁnes the overall rate of technical
progress rather than its direction. A similar result is reported in Acemoglu
(1998).
Second, wLM
min is the minimum relative wages that are required to give
enough incentives for workers to conduct R&D. If relative wages are lower
than this threshold, no worker without tacit knowledge conduct R&D, and
active R&D cannot be sustained in a competitive market. That is, a degree
of wage inequality due to tacit knowledge must exist to drive innovation in a
competitive economy. In addition, as far as the condition (RIC) is concerned,
there is a trade-oﬀ between wage inequality and R&D intensity.32
Third, the issue of increasing wage inequality in the U.S. in the 70s-80s is
studied extensively in the literature (see Acemoglu, 2002), and a large number
of studies attribute it to skill-biased technical progress. It basically means
that technical advance increases relative demand for skilled workers.33 That
is, causation runs from skilled-biased technical progress to increasing wage
inequality. On the other hand, Acemoglu (1998) argues that a higher wage
inequality induces technical progress in a model where monopoly proﬁts incen-
tivize private agents to do R&D. In contrast, the present model demonstrates
that the similar result can be obtained even without monopoly proﬁts.
32This statement is correct for m > 0, which is assumed in the present paper.
33See Leith, Li, and Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa (2003) for a study which examines the impact of
technical progress on labor supply.
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5 Introducing Monopoly Power
This section aims to answer the following questions. Dose a competitive market
generate a larger or smaller incentive for innovative activity than a monopoly
market? Under what conditions does technology advance at a faster rate
under competition than monopoly? What is the impact of patent protection
on R&D? To answer these questions, this section allows an innovator to earn
monopoly proﬁts due to codiﬁed knowledge in addition to returns from tacit
knowledge.
5.1 Returns from Codiﬁed and Tacit Knowledge
An innovator is granted a patent for her product. The statutory duration of
patent life is assumed to be inﬁnite. However, to set a stage for policy analysis
later, we assume that the government can determine the breadth of patents.34
Suppose that At is the highest quality of intermediate goods. The patent
breadth permits patent holders to prohibit the producer of the second-highest
quality goods from producing quality above φAt−1 where λ ≥ φ ≥ 1 measures
the patent breadth.35 The competitive economy analyzed above is equivalent
to φ = λ, i.e. no patent protection. Full patent protection is granted when
φ = 1.
Given the production function (3), demand for intermediate goods has a
price elasticity of −1/(1 − α). Therefore, taking into account that the second-
highest quality producer sets its price at marginal cost, the top-quality ﬁrm



















for λ < α−αφ
(29)
The case of θ ≡ α is called “drastic innovation” in the sense that ﬁrms’ price
decisions are not constrained by potential competition from incumbent pro-
ducers of lower-quality goods. This case arises if λ is suﬃciently large. On
the other hand, if λ is relatively small, the ﬁrm charges a limit price, i.e.
34O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998) for more details regarding the breadth of
patents.
35We are implicitly assuming that any quality level between At and At−1 can be produced
once At is invented.






α. In this case, the top-quality ﬁrm charges the price such that ﬁnal
output producers are just indiﬀerent between the state-of-the-art and second-
highest quality products.













Note that πt = 0 for φ = λ, which is the case considered in the previous
section.
Next let us calculate the expected value of future discounted returns from
innovation. There are two types of returns from R&D, i.e. πt and wK
t − wN
t .
Therefore, the proﬁt-augmented value of innovation, vt, is deﬁned by
rvt+1 = wK
t+1 − wN
t+1 + πt+1 + gt+1[(1 − µ)
Γt+2       
(Vt+2 − vt+1) − µvt+1] (31a)
rVt+2 = wK
t+2 − wN
t+2 + gt+2 [(1 − µ)(Vt+3 − Vt+2) − µVt+2] (31b)
πt+1 in (31a) represents returns from codiﬁed knowledge. This term tends
to increase the value of innovation, ceteris paribus. We term this eﬀect the
monopoly rent eﬀect, due to which R&D incentives tend to be higher than
in the case of perfect competition. On the other hand, the terms inside the
square brackets in (31a) show that the value of innovation changes due to
an extra quality improvement for two reasons. First, the value vt+1 is lost
with the probability of µ, if tacit knowledge becomes obsolete. Second, tacit
knowledge remains useful with the probability of (1 − µ), resulting in a change
in the value of innovation Γt+2, which can be rewritten as
Γt+2 = λVt+1 − vt+1. (32)
This change can be decomposed into two parts. (i) The value changes from
vt+1 to Vt+1, since proﬁts are lost. This change is obviously negative, tending
to make Γt+2 negative, i.e. capital loss. (ii) Due to an extra innovation, the
value increases by a factor λ. This eﬀect tends to make Γt+2 positive, leading
to capital gain. If proﬁts are suﬃciently large, then the eﬀect (i) dominates the
eﬀect (ii), hence, the value of Γt+2 is negative. In this case, R&D incentives
are adversely aﬀected by the introduction of monopoly power. We call this
the capital loss eﬀect. Of course, it is possible that the eﬀect (i) is dominated
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by the eﬀect (ii), in which case Γt+2 is positive and the capital loss eﬀect has
an opposite impact on R&D incentives.
The monopoly rent eﬀect and the capital loss eﬀect are identiﬁed above,
taking relative wages are taken as given. In equilibrium, relative wages also
change, aﬀecting R&D incentives. Those three eﬀects combined determined
how R&D intensity changes due to monopoly power. The issue is explored in
the next section.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis




























∆(g,w;θ) is a new term due to the introduction of monopoly power. The
term captures the monopoly rent eﬀect and the capital loss eﬀect. It is easy to
see that ∆(g,w;θ) = 0 for θ = 1 (i.e. φ = λ). It says that the R&D incentive
condition with monopoly (RIM) collapses to (RIC) in the absence of patent
protection of codiﬁed knowledge.
To explore properties of ∆(g,w;θ) further, note that ∆(g,w;θ) > 0 for
g = 0. Therefore, given the ﬁrst derivative in (33b), we can deﬁne the value
of g such that
∆(ˆ g,w;θ) = 0 ⇒ 1 =
(1 − µ)λˆ g
r + mˆ g
and x(ˆ g,w) > 0. (34)
In words, (34) says that there exists the value of g that makes the ∆ term
disappear from the condition (RIM). Note that ˆ g is unique. However, the
existence of ˆ g depends on parameter values and speciﬁc forms of cost functions.
In what follows, we focus on the case where ˆ g exists, since it gives us an
interesting insight on the issue at hand.36
36The following discussion will also brieﬂy consider the case where ˆ g does not exist.
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Now, we are in a position to compare competitive and monopoly equilibria.
Remember that a sole diﬀerence between the R&D incentive conditions (RIC)
and (RIM) is the term ∆(g,w;θ), which captures the monopoly rent eﬀect
and the capital loss eﬀect combined. In particular, those two eﬀects cancel
each other at ˆ g at which ∆(g,w;θ) = 0 when codiﬁed knowledge is protected
by patents (i.e. φ < λ). In other words, the R&D incentive conditions with
and without monopoly power coincide at ˆ g.
This property is exploited to draw Figure 4. In the ﬁgure, the monopoly
R&D incentive condition (RIM) is located above the competitive counterpart
(RIC) for g < ˆ g, and the relative positions are reversed for g > ˆ g. This can
be easily checked by totally diﬀerentiating (RIM) with respect to g and θ.37
An intuition goes as follows. For g > ˆ g, the capital loss eﬀect dominates the
monopoly rent eﬀect, identiﬁed above. Therefore, g is higher for given relative
wages in the monopoly equilibrium than in perfect competition. The reverse
holds for g < ˆ g.38
Turning to the labor market condition (LM), it is still valid in the presence
of monopoly power. Taking advantage of this convenient feature, we identify
two cases in Figure 4 where the two equilibrium conditions are depicted. In the
ﬁrst case, the total number of workers, L, is assumed to be relatively large.
Both competitive and monopoly equilibria are located above ˆ g. The ﬁgure
shows that R&D intensity is lower in a monopoly economy. Intuitively, a large
labor force means a large market for ﬁnal output. Accordingly, proﬁts are
large, so that the capital loss eﬀect dominates the monopoly rent eﬀect. Note
that the introduction of monopoly power decreases relative wages, reducing
R&D incentives based on returns from tacit knowledge. Therefore, returns
both from codiﬁed and tacit knowledge fall due to monopoly power.
In the second case, the working population is relatively small. Both com-
petitive and monopoly equilibria are now located below ˆ g. As Figure 4 con-
ﬁrms, R&D intensity is now higher in a monopoly economy. An intuitive
explanation is the opposite of the above case. That is, a small market size
generates low proﬁts, hence the capital loss eﬀect is also small or can even
reinforce the monopoly rent eﬀect, so that monopoly power boost R&D incen-
tives. Note that relative wages increases due to monopoly power. Therefore,
37We are assuming that c
x(w)x(g,w)/c
g(w) increases in w. This is satisﬁed if the produc-
tion functions of intermediate goods and R&D take Cobb-Douglas forms.
38For g < ˆ g, the eﬀect (i) of the capital loss eﬀect, identiﬁed on page 22, can dominate the
eﬀect (ii). In this case, the capital loss eﬀect reinforces the monopoly rent eﬀect.
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monopoly power raises returns both from codiﬁed and tacit knowledge.
Proposition 2. Under (34),
1. if L is relatively large, R&D intensity g is higher in a competitive econ-
omy than in an economy with monopoly power.
2. if L is relatively small, R&D intensity g is lower in a competitive econ-
omy than in an economy with monopoly power.
There are two points that merit mention. First, if the condition (34) is not
satisﬁed, ˆ g would be located in the infeasible (shaded) region in Figure 2 or 3.
In this case, Result 2 of the above proposition only is relevant. That is, the
introduction of monopoly power unambiguously promotes technical progress.
Second, the point where the R&D incentive condition cuts the horizontal axis
deﬁnes the minimum level of relative wages required for workers to do R&D.
Figure 4 demonstrates that such minimum relative wages are lower in the
monopoly equilibrium than the competitive equilibrium. This should be in-
tuitive. Returns from tacit knowledge does not need to be too high because
of additional returns from codiﬁed knowledge in the form of proﬁts. In this
sense, monopoly power somehow mitigates wage inequality required for tech-
nical progress.
5.3 Eﬀect of Stronger Patent Protection
In our model, the breadth of patent is captured by a parameter φ. To examine
its eﬀect on R&D intensity, suppose initially φ = λ (i.e., θ = 1), i.e. no
monopoly proﬁt. In this case, the monopoly R&D incentive condition coincides
with the competitive counterpart, which is depicted as a thick curve. Starting
from this situation, let us reduce φ marginally (stronger patent protection).

















Now, given that ˆ g is independent of φ, the monopoly R&D incentive con-
dition pivots around a point E in Figure 4. If the initial equilibrium is located
to the right of E, R&D intensity decreases. On the other hand, it increases
if the initial equilibrium is located to the left of E. An intuition should be
clear now. In the case of an equilibrium located to the right of point E in the
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ﬁgure, a large population means that monopoly proﬁts are large. Therefore,
the capital loss eﬀect is so strong that a stronger patent protection reduces
R&D incentives. The opposite intuition holds for the other case.39
Proposition 3. Under (34), a stronger patent protection of codiﬁed knowledge
1. reduces R&D intensity g and relative wages, if L is relatively large,
2. raises R&D intensity g and relative wages, if L is relatively small.
As φ falls, the R&D incentive condition pivots clockwise around the point
E in Figure 4. However, this movement applies as long as innovation is non-
drastic, i.e., λ < α−αφ in (29) is satisﬁed. If φ falls further, then innovation
becomes drastic (i.e. the above inequality is violated) and the R&D incentive
condition becomes independent of the parameter. In that case, a strong patent
protection cannot alter R&D intensity. That is, there is a limit on the eﬀect
of strengthening patent protection.
6 Conclusion
R&D-based models of endogenous technical progress rest on a premise that
technical progress is driven by proﬁt-seeking entrepreneurs. This literature
led to a dominant view that endogenous technical advance is not consistent
with perfect competition with constant returns to scale. Departing from this
dominant perspective, this paper demonstrates that technical progress endoge-
nously occurs in a perfectly competitive economy under constant returns to
scale in rivalrous inputs. The result is based on a hypothesis that two types
of knowledge, codiﬁed and tacit, are joint products of innovative activity.
In the paper, a simple model is developed to capture the hypothesis. Re-
turns that successful innovators earn consist of returns from the creation of
tacit knowledge and monopoly proﬁts, if codiﬁed knowledge is excludable. In a
competitive economy, R&D is compensated by competitive returns from tacit
knowledge alone.
An additional insight of the present study concerns the eﬀect of monopoly
power of a creator of codiﬁed knowledge. We demonstrate that monopoly
power does not necessarily increase R&D intensity. The case is identiﬁed
39Bessen and Maskin (2000) also show that strengthening patent protection can discourage
innovation.
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where R&D intensity falls with the introduction of monopoly power. This
means that a stronger patent protection, which a government may adopt to
promote innovation, can harm R&D incentives against its original intention.
We believe that these ﬁndings are important in furthering the understanding
of the nature of technical progress and patent policy.
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Figure 1: Flows of workers.























Figure 3: Competitive equilibrium for Ψ(w) < 0.









Figure 4: The eﬀect of monopoly power.
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